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THE LIABILITY OF A TRANSFEROR BY DELIVERY
AND OF A QUALIFIED INDORSER
WILLUI E. BRITTONt
Warranty With Respect to the VaZue of the INstrimenu t'
THERE is no general warranty that an instrument transferred by
delivery or qualified indorsement will be paid, or that prior parties
are solvent. Such a transferor, however, does warrant that he has
no knowledge that the instrument is valueless.
"It is extremely clear," said Lord Kenyon, in an early case, "that if the
holder of a bill of exchange sent it to market without indorsing his name
upon it, neither morality or the laws of this country will compel him to
xefund the money for which he has sold it if he did not know at the time
that it was not a good bill. ... If the defendants had known the bill
to be bad there is no doubt but that they would have been obliged to re-
fund the money."2
The question, as to what facts, when known by the transferor,
-will cast upon him this additional liability, is not definitely answered.
It is said that knowledge of the maker's insolvency is sufficient.3
Insolvency as here used apparently means suspension of payments.
It has even been held that knowledge by the transferor of the ex-
istence of another dishonored check of the same party whose instru-
ment was transferred by him was evidence sufficient to prove known
i-Professor of Law, University of Illinois.
1. This is a continuation of the article which appeared in (1930) 40 YALE
L. J. 215.
2. Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757 (K. B. 1790). Accord: Popley v. Ashley,
6 Mod. 147 (K. B. 1705); Read v. Hutchinson, 3 Campb. 351 (N. P. 1812);
Bicknall v. Waterman, 5 1t. I. 43 (1857), where the court said: "the vendee
takes the risk of past insolvency of the maker or other party to it, unless indeed
in case of past insolvency the vendor is guilty of the fraud of passing it off
with knowledge of that fact." Burgess v. Chapin, 5 R. I. 225 (1858); Fonda
v. Garland, 7 La. Ann. 201 (1852); Winter v. Bullock, 6 Ga. 232 (1849);
Gordon v. Irvine, 105 Ga. 144 (1898); Dayton v. Tillotson, 39 Iowa 404 (1874),
-where the court held the following instruction should have been given: "In
all cases where the assignor, whether by delivery or indorsement without re-
-course- of a negotiable instrument, knows it to be of no value . the
assignor may be compelled to repay or return the consideration thus received."




insolvency.4 Somewhat in contrast to this case the same court,
at a later time, held that knowledge that an acceptor was resorting
to unusual methods for the borrowing of money was not such a
fact as tended to show that the instrument transferred was value-
less.5
Whatever the boundary limits of this common law rule may be,
it is clear that it was sought to be codified in Section 65 (4) of
the Negotiable Instruments Law, which provides that "Every person
negotiating an instrument by delivery or by a qualified indorsement,
warrants that he has no knowledge of any fact which would impair
the validity of the instrument or render it valueless."
The warranty with respect to the value of the instrument is con-
fined to cases where the transferor has knowledge tending to induce
belief that it will not be paid. Where there is no such knowledge
there is no liability. At this point arises a question somewhat
analogous to that under discussion, i.e., as to the circumstances under
which a transfer of a negotiable instrument of a third party by
delivery alone or by indorsement without recourse will operate as a
discharge of the obligation sought to be paid. When the primrary
obligor on such instrument fails to pay, because of insolvency or
otherwise, may the creditor sue the debtor, transferor, on the
original debt? A complete discussion of this question is not here
attempted. There is much uncertainty and conflict in the cases.
Several of the leading ones are collected in the notes following.
Suffice it to say, there is a line of cases holding that a transfer of a
negotiable instrument by delivery or qualified indorsement, in pay-
ment of a contemporaneous obligation of the transferor, operates
as a discharge of such obligation, even though the instrument be
subsequently dishonored by the primary obligor thereon. That is,
the creditor could not thereafter sue the debtor on the underlying
debt or in any way hold him liable because of the dishonor of the
instrument. This result is, of course, quite in harmony with the
rule that the transferor does not warrant that the instrument will
be paid, or that the obligors thereon are solvent. In such a case if
the creditor desires the continued liability of his debtor he must
obtain his unqualified indorsement.
Where, however, the transfer was made in payment of an ante-
cedent obligation of the transferor, and the instrument proved un-
4. Brown v. Montgomery, 20 N. Y, 287 (1859), where Story J. said: "he
nevertheless warrants that he has no knowledge of any facts which prove the
paper to be worthless. . . ." Followed, in Boston National Bank v. Armour,
53 Hun *629, 6 N. Y. Supp. 714 (Sup. Ct. 1889). Accord: Young v. Adams,
6 Mass. 182 (1810).
5. People's Bank of the City of New York v. Bogart, 81 N. Y. 101 (1880).
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collectible, the creditor has been allowed to recover from the debtor
on the underlying debt. That is, such a transfer operates only as
conditional payment. This aspect of the rule is somewhat like a
warranty with respect to the value of the instrument but actually
it is not so because the creditor's action is always on the underlying
obligation. He does not sue the debtor on any independent implied
warranty. Some of the cases most often cited on the distinction
between the effects of transfers in payment of contemporaneous and
precedent debts are collected in the note.0 The cases dealing with
6. Clerk v. Mundell, 12 Mod. 203 (K. B. 1699); Bank of England v. New-
man, 1 Ld. Raym. 442 (K. B. 1700); Ward v. Evans, 2 Ld. Raym. 929 (K. B.
1704); Hartop v. Hoare, 3 Atk. 44 (Ch. 1743); Ex parto Roberts, 2 Cox Eq.
Cas. 170 (Ch. 1789); Fenn v. Harrison, 3 T. R. 757 (K. B. 1790), 4 T. R. 177
(K. B. 1791); Puckford v. Maxwell, 4 East 448 (K. B. 1794); Fydell v. Clark,
1 Esp. 447 (N. P. 1796); Ex parte Shuttleworth, 3 Ves. 367 (Ch. 1797). In
Ex parte Blackburne, 10 Ves. 205 (Ch. 1804), Lord Eldon recognized the dis-
tinction in the following language: "I take it to be now clearly settled, that
if there is an antecedent debt and a bill is taken, without taking an indorse-
ment, which bill turns out to be bad, the demand for the antecedent debt may
be resorted to. It has been held, that if there is no antecedent debt and A
carries a bill to B to be discounted and B does not take A's name upon the
bill, if it is dishonored, there is no demand; for there was no relation between
the parties except that transaction; and the circumstance of not taking the
name upon the bill is evidence of a purchase of the bill." In this case the
dishonored bill had been received in payment of a precedent debt. The bill
proved uncollectible and the creditor, transferee, was allowed to recover from
the debtor on the original debt.
Emly v. Lye, 15 East 6 (K. B. 1812); Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68 (N. Y.
1809) (court relied on Clerk v. Mundell, supra); Johnson v. Weed, 9 Johns.
310 (N. Y. 1812); Whitbeck v. Van Ness, 11 Johns. 409 (N. Y. 1814); Gibson
v. Tobey, 46 N. Y, 637 (1871); Roberts v. Fisher, 43 N. Y. 159 (1870);
Wilmot Engineering Co. v. Blanchard, 208 App. Div. 218, 203 N. Y. Supp.
700 (3rd Dep't 1924); Partee v. Bedford, 51 Mliss. 84 (1875) (relying on Clerk
v. Mundell, supra, Bank of England v. Newman, mtpra, and Whitbeci v.
Van Ness, supra); Glen v. Smith, 2 G. & J. 493, 509 (Did. 1830) (also relying
on the early English cases and Tobey v. Barber, 5 Johns. 68 (N. Y. 1809) );
Caldwell v. Hall, 49 Ark. 508, 1 S. W. 62 (1887), where the court said: "It is
an established rule of law that the acceptance by a creditor of the note of a
third person for a preexisting debt will not discharge the original cause of
action unless by agreement of the parties it is taken in payment of the prior
debt." Accord: Brown v. Olmsted, 50 Cal. 162 (1875); Hunter v. Moul, 98
Pa. St. 13 (1881); Shepherd v. Busch, 154 Pa. St. 149 (1893); League v.
Waring, 85 Pa. St. 244 (1877); Sullivan v. Saunders, 66 W. Va. 350 (1909);
Young v. Hibbs, 5 Neb. 433 (1877); Wilhelm v. Schmidt, 84 IIl. 183 (1876);
Wainwright v. Webster, 11 Vt. 576 (1839). "Well established that where a
note of a third person is received in payment of a precedent debt the risk of
solvency of the maker is upon the party from whom the bill is received."
Harley v. Thornton (1833), reported in a note to Brumby v. Dugan, 2 Hill
508 (S. C. 1834).
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the effects of transfers of bank notes in payment of present or
antecedent indebtedness of the transferor treat the problem some-
what differently and there is conflict among them.7 The whole
matter is referred to here only for the purpose of calling attention
to the fact that there are cases where the transferor assumes the
risk of non-payment of instruments transferred by him, although
this liability is not enforced by an action for breach of warranty or
by rescission. This being so, there is no reason to assume that the
Negotiable Instruments Law would in any way change whatever
rule may be in force. The question is one as to what constitutes
payment and this term is not so defined in the Act as to make
mandatory the adoption of any particular conception of it.
To Whom Warranties Run
AT common law the warranties of a transferor by delivery and of
a qualified indorser ran only to their immediate transferees who
paid value.8 In one state, at least, remote assignees are allowed to
Cf. Wiseman v. Lyman, 7 Mass. 286 (1811); Ely v. James, 123 Mass. 36
(1877); Day v. Kinney, 131 Mass. 37 (1881); Hecht v. Batcheller, 147 Iass.
335 (1888). And compare: Bartsch v. Atwater, 1 Conn. 408 (1815); DiUe v.
White, 132 Iowa 327, 109 N. W. 909 (1906); Garretsie v. Van Ness, 2 N. J. L,
17 (1806); Mackie's Ex. v. Davies, 2 Wash. 219 (Va. 1796); Saunders v.
Marshall, 4 H. & M. 455 (Va. 1809).
7. Transfer of a bank note of a failed bank discharged the debt, whether
contemporaneous or precedent, subject, however, to the condition that if the
creditor presented the note to the bank within a reasonable time and failed
to obtain the money, and notified the debtor, the transferor would be hold liable
on the original debt in both cases. Tassel v. Lewis, 1 Ld. Raym. 743 (I. B.
1700); Moore v. Warren, 1 Strange 415 (K. B. 1721); Manwaring v. Harrison,
1 Strange 508 (K. B. 1722) ; Stedman v. Gooch, 1 Esp. 3 (N. P. 1793) ; Camidge
v. Allenby, 6 B. & C. 372 (K. B. 1827); Turner v. Stones, 1 D. & L. 122
(Eng. Bail Ct. Rep. 1843); Timmins v. Gibbins, 18 Q. B. 722, (1852); Guardians
of the Poor of Litchfield Union v. Green, 26 Law Jour. Rep. Ex. 140 (1857).
Compare Massachusetts rule: Young v. Adams, 6 Mass. 181 (1810), in which
a greater risk falls on the transferee of the notes of a failed bank than under
the English rule. And along the same line compare Bayard v. Shunk, 1 W. & S.
92 (Pa. 1841); Scruggs v. Gass, 8 Yerg. 175 (Tenn. 1835); Ware v. James
A. Street Co., 39 Tenn. 609 (1859); Edmunds v. Digges, 1 Grat. 360 (Va. 1845);
and Lowrey v. Murrell, 2 Porter 280 (Ala. 1835).
New York rule: Lightbody v. The Ontario Bank, 11 Wend. 9 (N. Y. 1833),
13 Wend. 101 (N. Y. 1834), draws no distinction between the effect of transfers
of bank notes of a failed bank and the notes of third parties generally. Accord:
Gilman v. Peck, 11 Vt. 516 (1839); Wainwright v. Webster, 11 Vt. 576 (1839);
Townsend v. Bank of Racine, 7 Wis. 185 (1859). And compare the following
cases: Magee v. Carmack, 13 Ill. 289 (1851); Bank v. Morse, 22 Mo. 88
(1842); Corbit v. Bank of Smyrna, 2 Harr. 235 (Del. 1837).
8. Watson v. Chesire, 18 Iowa 202 (1865); Brown v. Summers, 91 Ind.
151 (1883); Mardis v. Tyler, 49 Ky. 376 (1850); Elliot v. Threlkeld, 55 Xy.
341 (1855).
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sue by statute.9 And it has been suggested that a remote assignor,
under special circumstances, may be reached in equity.1" In any
event, the cause of action for breach of warranty could be expressly
assigned n The mere transfer of the instrument did not, of itself,
operate as an assignment of the cause of action."
Under the Negotiable Instruments Law13 the common law rule
which restricts the right to sue for breach of warranty to immediate
transferees is continued as regards transfers by delivery only. The
Act provides: "But when the negotiation is by delivery only, the
warranty extends in favor of no holder other than the immediate
transferee." This language does not forbid the express assignment
of such causes of action and this presumably may still be done under
the Act. The implication of this section is that the warranties of the
qualified indorser will run to remote holders. This point is not as
clear as it should be but this conclusion seems the more reasonable
9. Broaddus Institute v. Siers, 68 W. Va. 125, 69 S. E. 468 (1910), the court
saying: "This action could not have been maintained against defendant at
common law because he was a remote assignor with whom plaintiff had no
contract. (Citing Watson v. Chesire, supra note 8). But the West Virginia
statute provides that an assignee may sue a remote assignor on his implied
warranty."
10. An assignee of a non-negotiable instrument cannot sue a remote assignor
"because there is no privity of contract between them. The recourse of an
assignee against remote assignors can only be reached by a proceeding in the
nature of a bill in equity setting forth the equitable circumstances which render
such assignors liable to the last assignee." Weaver v. Beard, 21 Mo. 155 (1855).
11. Watson v. Chesire, 18 Iowa 202 (1865), where the court said: "It may
be that Griffith (the indorsee without recourse from the payee) might specially
assign his cause of action against Chesire (the payee and indorser without
recourse) to the plaintiff (indorsee without recourse from Griffith) but the mere
indorsement of the note without recourse would not have that effect."
And it was so held in Smith v. McNair, 19 Kan. 330 (1877), where A, the
defendant, sold a forged school district bond to B. B sold to C. The forgery was
discovered. B "assigned in writing his cause of action against A, the considera-
tion for the assignment was the liability of B to C." C recovered from A. The
court said: "The implied warranty of genuineness by Smith & Son, (defendant
A.) was broken the instant of delivery and they at once became liable to their
vendees for the amount they received. Defendants were in no wise affected by
such second sale and could not plead such sale in bar of the rights of B against
them nor against B's assignee, C, who stands in the shoes of B in this case."
12. Watson v. Chesire, supra note 11.
In harmony with the idea that the transfer of the instrument does not of
itself operate as an assignment of a cause of action against a prior assignor,
see Bankhead v. Owen, 60 Ala. 457 (1877), where it was held that a grantor's
lien, while it passes by unqualified indorsement of the grantor of the notes
representing the purchase price, does not pass by a transfer by delivery or
indorsement without recourse.
13. § 65 (4).
1932]
YALE LAW JOURNAL
because the framers of the Act expressly mentioned qualified in-
dorsers and transferors by delivery in the first part of Section 65
and refrained from incorporating any reference to qualified indorsers
in the sentence above quoted. Moreover, a supporting inference is
derived from Section 66, which provides that the warranties of
unqualified indorsers run to remote holders. The draftsmen may
have thought there was more reason to permit the warranties of
former owners whose names appeared on the instrument, either as
qualified or unqualified indorsers, to run to remote holders than
there was to allow such actions against those former owners whose
names did not appear on the instrument.
Do the warranties of the qualified indorser run to all remote
holders or only to remote holders in due course? It has been sug-
gested 14 that because Section 66 provides that the warranties of the
unqualified indorser shall run only to subsequeni holders in due
course, that this same restriction should be read into Section 65.
This possibility is conceivable but not desirable or necessary. It is
believed that the section imposes liability on the qualified indorser
to all remote holders whether holders in due course as regards him
or any other obligor, or not. Of course, if a particular indorsee
who derives title through an indorsement without recourse has
knowledge of the facts which constitute the breach of warranty, he
can be denied the right to recover for this reason, as is true generally
with respect to actions for breach of implied warranty. There
is no reason to assume that this line of common law decisions is not
still available under Section 196 in the interpretation of Section 65.
Would the warranties of a special indorsee who transferred with-
out indorsement run only to his immediate transferee? Such a
person is one kind of transferor by delivery and on this view his
liability would run no further. If the suggestion that the reason for
making the distinction between transferors by delivery and qualified
indorsers was that because the former's name did not appear on the
instrument and the latter's name did appear, has merit, it would
seem that the liability of a special indorsee who transferred without
indorsement, would not run beyond his immediate transferee. The
Section does, however, present a technical difficulty to this con-
struction. The Section provides: "But when the negotiation is by
delivery only, the warranty extends in favor of no holder" etc. A
transfer by a special indorsee who does not indorse is not a negotia-
tion under Section 30, nor is his transferee a technical holder under
Section 191. Therefore, it could be urged that the case under dis.
14. By two of the judges in Moody v. Morris-Roberts Co., 38 Idaho 414, 226
Pac. 278 (1923).
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cussion is not controlled by Section 65. It is'believed that this view
should not for this reason prevail. The term "negotiation" should
not always be confined to the straight jacket definition of Section
30, under which a transfer to constitute a negotiation must be to
a holder, as the latter term is defined in Section 191. It has been
expanded in other connections and may very well be so here so as
to include the transfer of a special indorsee who does not indorse.
Moreover, the term "holder" may be given a meaning other than
that of a "payee or indorsee . . . or the bearer of a bill or
note payable to bearer" because this definition by Section 191, is not
mandatory if the "context otherwise requires." However, there is
another approach to this problem of construction. If one begins
with the idea that it is desirable to interpret ambiguous statutory
language in the Act ih such a way as to increase the value of the
instrument, then the terms "negotiation" and "holder" as used in
the quoted language from Section 65, could be seized upon as a
means of taking the case under discussion out of the express language
and allowing it to be controlled by the negative implication thereof,
i.e., that the liability of such a transferor would run to all remote
transferees.
Statute of Limitations
As is true with respect to implied warranties of quality generally15
the breach, if any, occurs at the time of sale, hence the statute of
limitations begins to run at the time of transfer.10 The point has
been made that while the cause of action for breach of warranty
which involves a total failure of consideration, begins to run from
the time of transfer, where the failure was partial "the cause of
action is not complete until the plaintiff has procured a judicial
establishment of the failure of consideration and the extent there-
of."' 7 And, it has been held that the statute of limitations does
not begin to run until the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the breach
or by the exercise of reasonable diligence could have done so.18 There
15. WILLISTON ON SALES (2d ed. 1924) § 212 (a).
16. McNeill v. Knott, 11 Ga. 142 (1852), where the court held: "If the note
was paid by one of the makers, to the original holder, at the time it was in-
dorsed, there can be no doubt, that a right of action accrued immediately in
favor of plaintiff, upon the indorsement.". Flynn v. Allen, 57 Pa. St. 482 (1868);
Blethen v. Lovering, 58 Me. 437 (1870), the court holding that "The liability
of the defendant (indorser without recourse) accruing then at the time of his
indorsement, the statute of limitations constitutes a bar." Willis v. French,
84 Me. 593 (1892).
17. Trustees of Broaddus Institute v. Siers, 68 W. Va. 125 (1910).
18. Ripley v. Withee, 27 Tex. 14 (1863); Persons v. Jones, 12 Ga. 371 (1853),
where the court held: "The cause of action (deceit) of a transferee against his
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appears to be nothing in the Negotiable Instruments Law which
would nullify or change the existing rule on limitations in any juris-
diction.
Remedies
AN indorsee or transferee may rescind the contract under which
he acquired the instrument for fraud, or mistake or for breach of
warranty, according as the facts establish such rights and the
consequent causes of action for recovery of the consideration parted
with. He may also maintain an independent action for deceit,1
if the facts support it, or for breach of warranty. If the purchaser
of the instrument rescinds for breach of warranty the parties are
put back in the position they occupied before the transfer was made.
If he brings an independent action for breach of warranty the con-
tract is enforced. The distinction between rescission and independ-
ent action was well put by the Supreme Court of West Virginia in
the following language:
"The assignee [from an indorser without recourse] has a right of election
between rescission on the one hand, involving surrender of the paper and
action for the whole consideration paid, and affirmance on the other, with
a right of action for breach of warranty. In the first case, he would look
to the assignor only. In the other, he would hold both parties, the acceptor,
maker or obligor for the valid part of the debt and the assignor for the
balance."20
Other cases bearing on this distinction are collected in the note.2'
Some courts are not inclined to adopt the distinction between
transferor of a note void for usury between the maker and payee, accrued
instantly upon transfer of the usurious paper," but the statute of limitations
began to run from the date the plaintiff acquired knowledge of the cause of
action. In Camp Manufacturing Co. v. Durham Fertilizer Co., 150 N. C. 417
(1909), the court did not take a definite position on the point but hold the
cause of action for breach of warranty that a judgment was valid arises "in
any event at the time the assignee learned of the breach." Cf. P. I-. Sheehy
Co. v. Eastern Mfg. Co., 44 App. D. C. 107 (1915).
19. Jamison v. Copher, 35 Mo. 483 (1865) (indorsee from an unqualified
indorser allowed to recover from his indorser in an action of deceit); Laruo
v. Barbee, 184 Ky. 354, 212 S. W. 142 (1919) (indorser without recourse held
liable in his indorsee's action against -him in deceit); Wallace & Co. v. First
Nat. Bank of Superior, 102 Neb. 358, 167 N. W. 416 (1918) (transferee of a
note recovered from his transferor in deceit). Accord: Bridge v. Batchalder,
9 Allen 394 (Mass. 1864).
20. Trustees of Broaddus Institute v. Siers, 68 W. Va. 125 (1910).
21. Coolidge v. Brigham, 42 Mass. 547 (1840), where the court said: "The
plaintiff was at liberty either to restore the note to the defendant or to retain
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rescission and its consequent action to recover what was parted
with and an independent action for breach of warranty.2 Return
of the instrument is a condition precedent to the vendee's right of
rescission and to his right of, recovery of the consideration paid to
his vendor.23  But this condition precedent may be waived by the
vendor.24 But where the instrument is valueless for all purposes
its restoration to the vendor is not a condition precedent to the
vendee's right to recover the consideration paid.25 But the mere
fact that the instrument in question bears the forged signature of
the obligor and has no genuine indorsements thereon will not of
itself destroy the condition.
2
0
it and resort to his action on the warranty." And, again, the court in
-Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y. 226 (1859), said: "On the part of the
defendant (transferor) it has been insisted that the plaintiffs might have
returned the note as worthless immediately after they received it, and at once
commenced their action to recover back the money which they had advanced
upon it. This is clearly so. . . . if he can and will restore the other to his
previous situation. But they . . . were not bound to do so. The present
action proceeds on an affirmance instead of a disaffirmtince of the transaction
between them and the defendant."
Webb v. Odell, 49 N. Y. 583 (1872) (rescission). And in Gabay v. Doane,
66 App. Div. 507, 73 N. Y. Supp. 381 (1st Dep't 1901), the court allowed a
transferee to recover from his transferor on the latter's warranty that prior
signatures were valid, even though some of them were admittedly valid. "The
fact that the note was not void as to Robinson did not preclude plaintiff from
recovering the damages he sustained because of the fact that the note was void
as to Riley." Summers v. Richie, 3 Yeates 531 (Pa. 1803), where the court said:
"The plaintiff might retain the note and recover for breach of warranty or
return the note and recover in the present form of action-[money had and
received]."
22. It would seem to he more accurate to say that the right of recovery
is for the purchase money, because of the failure of the consideration upon
which it was paid, than to say that it is for the breach of an implied warranty
that the article is that which was professed to be sold. Lunt v. Wrenn, 113
Ill. 168 (1885).
23. Coolidge v. Brigham, 1 Mete. 547 (Mass. 1840), 5 Mete. 68 (1842);
Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y. 226 (1859); Baldwin v. Van Deusen, 37
N. Y. 487 (1868); Webb v. Odell, 49 N. Y. 583 (1872); Summers v. Riehie,
supra note 21.
24. Roth v. Crissy, 30 Pa. St. 145 (1858).
25. "There was no necessity to return the scrip (for government land, cer-
tificates having been declared void) because it could be of no possible value
to the owner." Lunt v. Wrenn, 113 Ill. 168 (1885). Similarly in Smith v.
McNair, 19 Kan. 330 (1877), recovery by a transferee against the transferor
of a bond bearing the forged signature of the obligor was allowed without
returning the bond, the court saying: "The bonds were forged and entirely
worthless to all parties. In such case the return would be a useless ceremony
which the law never requires."
26. "The reason why it is held, where payments have been made in counter-
feit bills, the bills must be returned within a reasonable time to authorize the
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The burden is on the plaintiff to prove the breach of warranty by
defendant.27  If the vendor has notice of the action by his vendee
against a prior party he is concluded by the judgment in such
action.28  It was at one time held in Kentucky 29 that the liability of
the vendor was conditioned upon the vendee's having first sued the
prior party within a reasonable time after the sale. Not until judg-
ment went against such vendee could the latter sue his vendor. But
this decision requiring the judicial determination of the non-liability
of a prior party as a condition precedent to,the liability of the
vendor has been overruled. 0 Some courts have held that the judg-
ment in favor of the prior party will not be conclusive against the
vendor unless, in addition to the receipt of notice by the vendee of
his proposed action against such prior party, the vendee couples
with the notice to the vendor a request that the vendor take charge
of the litigation and that on his default the vendee will look to the
vendor for indemnity.81  This view has been criticised.
32
payee to recover from the payer, is to enable the payer to trace out and fall
back upon the person from whom he received them." Lunt v. Wrenn, 113 111.
168 (1885).
27. Moore v. Worthington, 63 Ky. 307 (1865), holding that where there is
lio proof that the instrument sold was not obligatory on the maker the trans-
feree cannot recover from the transferor. Accord: Hunt v. Sanders, 288 Mo.
337, 232 S. W. 456 (1921) (under N. I. L.).
28. Where the holder of a note fails to recover from the maker because of
a forged indorsement on the instrument, and notice of this litigation was given
to prior indorsers, the judgment is conclusive in an action by such holder
against the prior indorser. First National Bank of Mount Vernon v. The First
National Bank of Lincoln, 68 Ohio St. 43 (1903). Accord: Drennan v. Bunn,
124 Ill. 175 (1888).
29. Transferee sued the obligor of a note and on the latter's plea of von
est factum, abandoned the action and sued his transferor. Held that this is
insufficient proof of the maker's defense. Wynn v. Poynter, 3 Bush 54 (Ky.
1867), where the court said: "We repeat that to recover on the implied guaranty
of genuineness, as well as to recover on the implied guaranty of solvency . . .
an action on the bond must have been prosecuted with the same legal diligence
on each guaranty and surely in each case the genuineness or solvency must
be judicially determined." This rule seems inconsistent with the earlier cases
of Roberts v. Atwood, 8 B. Mon. 209, (Ky. 1847), and Emmerson v. Claywell,
14 B. Mon. 15 (Ky. 1853).
30. This rule was reluctantly followed in McCormack v. Ware, 13 Ky. L.
678 (1891), but expressly overruled in Ware v. McCormack, 96 Ky. 139 (1894),
where the court said: "The doctrine of Wynn v. Poynter, is overruled ...
This [rule] we hold not to be the law. . . . the vendee may sue [the vendor]
at once to recover damages." Accord: Terry v. Bissell, 26 Conn. 23 (1857);
Whitney v. The National Bank of Potsdam, 45 N. Y. 303 (1871).
31. Paul v. Whitman, 3 W. & S. 410 (Pa. 1842); Sowers v. Schmidt, 24
Wis. 417 (1869).
32. Drennan v. Bunn, 124 Ill. 175 (1888).
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But it has been held that where a vendee sues the obligor in the
courts of one state and is defeated because of a defense good as
against him, such judgment is not conclusive as to the existence of
the defense in an action by such vendee against his indorser without
recourse33 Mere lapse of time before the defense of the prior party
is discovered by the vendee will not bar his remedy against his
vendor, though after discovery of such defense, notice thereof must
be given within a reasonable time to his vendor.34
Measure of Damages
AN indorsee of a negotiable instrument who acquires title from an
unqualified indorser at a discount, in the event of dishonor, may
recover from the indorser the full face value of the instrument.2
The same rule should obtain where the transferee by delivery or
indorsee from a qualified indorser sues for breach of warranty, yet
most of the cases seem to treat such actions, on the question of
33. Kail v. Bell, 88 Kan. 666 (1913).
34. Frank v. Lanier, 91 N. Y. 112 (1883); Rick v. Kelly, 30 Pa. St. 527
(1858), where the court said: "The judgment of the court is that notice of the
forgery -within a reasonable time after its discovery and an offer to return
the note are necessary to the maintenance of an action for the recovery of
the money, unless the note be shown to possess no value." In Thomas v. Todd,
6 Hill 340 (N. Y. 1844) something less than two months was held too long.
In Raymond v. Bear, 13 S. & R. 318 (Pa. 1825), six months was held gross
negligence. In Gloucester Bank v. The Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 33 (1820), a
failure of fifteen days was held to defeat the action.
35. Roark v. Turner, 2D Ga. 455 (1859) (indorsee who paid defendant in-
dorser $1750 for a note for $1950, was allowed to recover the face of the note).
The dissenting judge argued that, under the rule adopted, "the indorsement
amounted to a promise by him to pay $1950 in consideration of receiving $1750.
Now I say that for this promise there was a want of consideration to the ex\tent
-of $200." To which the majority replied: "If the consideration on both sides
-was money this reasoning might do . . . but the fallacy consists in assuming
that in such other cases equality of values is attainable. . . . A promise is
a species of property and has no more a fixed money value than a horse. For
the reason that the law cannot weigh the value of the promise it leaves the
parties, to adjust it by their contract." Accord: Felton v. Smith, 88 Ind. 149
(1882); National Bank of Michigan v. Green, 33 Iowa 140 (1871) (refers to
the conflict and adopts the above rule); Durant v. Banta, 27 N. J. L. 624
(1858), where the court said: "As to the doctrine that the indorsee of a note
-who buys it at less than its face can only recover from the indorser the amount
paid him -with interest, in ease the maker does not pay it, seems to be without
any foundation in law." Van Vleeb v. Sledge, 45 Fed. 743 (C. C. W. D. Tenn.
1890), after referring to the "diversity of ruling on the point" said that "the
sounder principle is found in the rule which makes the indorser liable for the
face of the note (for) his legal undertaking is that he will pay the note if the
maker fails to do so at maturity on proper demand and notice."
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measure of damage, as though they were based on a rescission of
the contract and limit recovery to the amount paid.80 The contrary
rule which permits the purchaser to recover from the seller the full
face value of the instrument, where it was obtained at a discount,
seems preferable.3 7 Under both theories the purchaser is allowed
to recover interest and costs incurred by him in suing the primary
obligor.38 The vendee recovers, not only the costs of his unsuccess-
ful actions against antecedent parties but also the costs of success-
ful actions brought against him by his vendee.89 If he has received
36. Cook v. Cockrill, I Stew. 475 (Ala. 1828), "where the consideration pass-
ing between the indorsee and indorser is not equal to the amount of the note
the indorsee, in an action against the indorser can only recover the consideration
which he has already paid." Accord: Coye v. Palmer, 16 Cal. 159 (1860); Ware
v. McCormack, 96 Ky. 139 (1894).
Parlange v. Faures, 14 La. Ann. 448 (1859) ($1200 note sold for $1100. Held:
judgment against the transferor should have been for $1100); Sere v. Faures,
15 La. Ann. 189 (1860); Coolidge v. Brigham, 46 Mass, 68 (1842); French
v. Grindle, 15, Me. 163 (1838); Kiunk v. O'Fallon, 1 Mo. 264 (1824); McAdam
v. Grand Forks Merc. Co., 24 N. D. 645, 140 N. W. 725 (1913); Aldrich v.
Jackson, 5 R. I. 218 (1858) (transferee recovered $781, the amount paid for
an $800 note) ; Hall v. Latimer, 81 S. C. 90 (1908) (indorsee of a note for $134
recovered from his indorser without recourse $130, the amount paid for the
note); Daskam v. Ullman, 74 Wis. 474, 43 N. W. 321 (1889).
37. Bennett v. Buchan, 61 N. Y. 222 (1874), where a judgment for $1,038.40
against four partners was sold to plaintiff at a discount of 90%. Prior thereto
the sole solvent judgment debtor had been released by the judgment creditors.
In an action by the purchaser of the judgment against the seller, the court
held that it was error to enter judgment for the plaintiff for the purchase
price alone. "She [the vendee] was entitled to recover the difference betveen
the value of the judgment as it was and its value if Gillet had not been re-
leased. The same rule must be applied which is applied in the case of breach
of warranties in the sale of chattels."
38. Kingsley v. Fitts & Avery, 55 Vt. 293 (1883), where an account for
$121.61 was sold for $100.00, plaintiff recovered the $100.00 plus interest and
costs of an unsuccessful suit against the obliger, making a total of $197.10,
for which judgment was entered. "The assignee is entitled not only to recover
the amount paid for the note, with its interest, but all the costs and expenses
incurred in the prosecution of the action to enforce its collection." Hurst v.
Chambers, 75 Ky. 155 (1876). Accord: Delaware Bank v. Jarvis, 20 N. Y.
226 (1859). Lawton v. Howe, 14 Wis. 241 (186i). The following cases sup-
port this rule, either directly or by implication: Sneed v. Hughes, 14 Ga. 54a
(1854); French v. Turner, 15 Ind. 59 (1860); Baldwin v. Threlkeld, 8 Ind.
App. 312, 34 N. E. 851 (1893); Snyder v. Reno, 38 Iowa 329 (1874); Smith v.
McNair, 19 Kan. 330 (1877); Elliot v. Threlkeld, 55 Ky. 341 (1855); Hall v.
Latimer, 81 S. C. 90 (1908). But the vendor will not be liable for costs of
suit incurred in an action brought by the vendee against the maker, when, prior
to suit the vendor made known to his vendee his willingness to pay the amount
of the note to him. Copp v. M'Dugall, 9 Mass. 1 (1812).
39. Frank v. Lanier, 91 N. Y. 112 (1883).
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any pecuniary advantage from the instrument, such sum will be
deducted.40
Warranties of the Unqualified Thdorser
AN unqualified indorser on negotiable paper is under two forms of
liability4' to subsequent holders for value. He is liable as a vendor
and also on his special contract of indorsement. As a vendor his
liability is of the same nature as that of the qualified indorser and
the transferor by delivery. The latter party's liability was worked
out at common law on a theory of implied warranty against defenses
and equities of prior parties. This theory was continued in Section
65 of the Negotiable Instruments Law. The liability of the un-
qualified indorser as a vendor might likewise have been so developed
but the idea of estoppel was used to accomplish substantially the
same results
4 2
At common law, the cases which involved the liability of an un-
qualified indorser were few in number, probably for the reason that
the liability of the unqualified indorser, on his special contract of
indorsement, as distinguished from his liability as a vendor, was
sufficient to protect the holder. Having entered into the special
40. Lawton v. Howe, 14 Wis. 241 (1861).
41. The double aspect of the liability of an unqualified indorser is illustrated
by the decision that his release "as indorser" does not release him as a vendor.
Bevan v. Fitzsimmons, 40 Ill. App. 108 (1890).
42. Crithlow v. Parry, 2 Campb. 182 (N. P. 1809); Ex parto Clark, 3
Brown C. C. 238 (Ch. 1791); Thicknesse v. Bromilow, 2 C. & J. 425 (Ex. 1832);
MacGregor v. Rhodes, 6 E. & B. 266 (K. B. 1856), where Lord Campbell said:
"The defendants (regular indorsers) having, when they handed the bill to the
plaintiff, represented the title as a just one, cannot now deny that it is so."
Accord: Woodward v. Harbin, 1 Ala. 104 (1840), the court saying: "A party
who has indorsed a note, cannot when sued upon his indorsement, be allowed
to object that the name of the maker or previous indorser is not genuine . . .
and though they be forgeries in fact, a subsequent indorser cannot set up such
a defense;" Burrill v. Smith, 7 Pick. 291 (Mass. 1828), ("indorser not at liberty
to deny the validity of the contract which he has assigned"); State Bank v.
Fearing, 16 Pick. 533 (Mass. 1835) (indorser "admitted the legal ability and
signature of every antecedent party"); Prescott Bank v. Caverly, 7 Gray 217
(Mass 1856); Dalrymple v. Hillenbrand, 62 N. Y. 5 (1875) (indorser "cannot
deny the fact' that the instrument was executed by the firm in whose name
it was executed); Donohoe v. Meeker, 35 App. Div. 43, 54 N. Y. Supp. 286
(3rd Dep't 1898) (indorser "estopped from asserting invalidity"); Beal v.
Alexander, 6 Tex. 531 (1851) (indorser "cannot be heard to question com-
petency"); Crosby v. Wright, 70 Minn. 251 (1897) (unqualified indorser can-
not deny that the maker of the note was not a corporation); Henderson v.
Lemly, 79 N. C. 169 (1378) (indorser estopped to deny that maker's name was
signed without authority).
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contract,' there was rarely any occasion for resort to a different
theory of liability, narrower in scope and somewhat overshadowed
if not concealed by the special engagement. Nevertheless it is be-
lieved that at common law the liability of the unqualified indorser
as a vendor was the same as that of the qualified indorser and
transferor by delivery. The only difference was that the one used
the idea of estoppel to produce the results, the other, the theory of
warranty.
The difference between the two forms of liability is important.
An action on the indorser's special contract of indorsement is con-
ditioned on presentment, notice and protest; his liability for breach
of warranty is not so conditioned.43 Again, the action on the special
engagement cannot be brought until maturity of the instrument
while the action for breach of warranty, occurring as it does at the
time of transfer, may be brought at any time.
44
The implied warranties of a qualified indorser, of a transferor
by delivery and of an unqualified indorser should be identical, be-
cause the liability of each party arises from the fact, common to
each, of a transfer for value. At common law this was true except
as modified by Littauer v. Goldman.45 This exception was codified
in Section 65 (4). One would expect it to be introduced into Section
66, which fixes the warranties of the unqualified indorser. But for
some reason, this policy was not adopted. The result is that the
liability of an unqualified indorser as a warrantor is substantially
different from that of the qualified indorser and transferor by
delivery.
43. Cochran v. Atchison, 27 Kan. 728 (1882), where the court said: "It is
well settled by the authorities, if it turns out that any of these latter engage-
ments are not fulfilled (presentment and notice), the indorser may be sued for
the recovery of the original consideration which has failed or be held liable as
a party without proof of demand and notice." Accord: Copp v. M'Dugall,
9 Mass. 1 (1812); Furgerson v. Staples, 82 Me. 159, (1889), where the court
said: "If the note transferred by indorsement be a forgery or absolutely void
for any other reason, the indorser may be sued for the original consideration
paid him . . . without demand and notice." Turnbull v. Bowyer, 40 N. Y.
456 (1869).
44. Chandler v. Mason, 2 Vt. 193 (1829). In this case the indorsee failed
to recover from an unqualified indorser because of no demand or notice. Court
said that if the common counts were added plaintiff could recover. "None of
us entertain any doubt but that the plaintiff, upon a proper declaration, and
clearly establishing that the note was without consideration and void, might
recover of the defendant without showing a demand of the maker." . . . In
such case "the indorsee may forthwith sue the indorser and recover if he can
show the note thus indorsed to be a mere nullity. . . . He need not wait till
the note becomes payable, nor demand payment, nor give notice back."
45. 72 N. Y. 506 (1878).
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The similarities and differences between the liability of an indorser
without recourse and transferor by delivery, on the one hand, and
that of the unqualified indorser on the other, are as follows. The
liabilities imposed by Section 65 (1) (2) and (3), i.e., the warranties
against real defenses and outstanding legal titles, are expressly in-
corporated in Section 66 (1). This sub-section provides: "Every
indorser who indorses without qualifications warrants to all sub-
sequent holders in due course the matters and things mentioned in
subdivisions one, two and three of the next preceding section." At
this point identity of liability between the two groups of vendors of
negotiable paper ends, and differences begin. By Section 65 (4)
the qualified indorser and transferor by delivery warrant "that he
has no knowledge of any fact which would impair the validity of
the instrument or render it valueless." In lieu of this warranty
the unqualified indorser, under Section 66 (2) warrants "that the
instrument is at the time of his indorsement valid and subsisting."
Thus the qualified indorser and transferor by delivery warrant
ignorance of invalidity and the unqualified indorser warrants against
invalidity irrespective of his knowledge or ignorance of the facts.
This difference is considerable. As previously pointed out, the
probabilities are that Section 65 (4) will be construed to impose a
warranty against all personal defenses only when the defendant had
knowledge of the facts constituting such defense. The unqualified
indorser by Section 66 (2) warrants against all personal defences,
for if he warrants that the instrument is "valid and subsisting" he
must warrant that all prior parties are liable. If personal defenses
are outstanding the instrument could not be regarded as "valid and
subsisting", except on the theory that as regards personal defenses
an instrument could be said to be subsisting in the hands of a holder
in due course.
When the Negotiable Instruments Law is amended Section 65 (4)
and Section 66 (2) should be made harmonious, preferably by re-
pealing this aspect of Section 65 (4) and substituting for it the
language of Section 66 (2).
A second difference between the warranties under Section 65 and
Section 66 is that under Section 65 there is a warranty that the
qualified indorser and the transferor by delivery '"as no knowledge
of any fact which would . . . render it [the instrument] value-
less." Under Section 66 there is no similar warranty. Of
course, the unqualified indorser will be liable in such case on his
special engagement as an indorser but this liability is conditioned
on presentment and notice while that on the warranty would not
be, and his liability as an indorser would not arise until maturity




A third possible difference between the liabilities under Section
65 and Section 66, involves the parties to whom liabilities run. Under
Section 65, the warranties of one who negotiates by delivery "extends
in favor of no holder other than the immediate transferee." As stated
above, under this section the liability of the qualified indorser, by
implication, runs to all subsequent holders whether holders in due
course or not. In all probability, the warranty could not be enforced
by one who at the time of transfer had knowledge of the facts which
constituted the breach of warranty for in such case the warranty
may be deemed negatived by extrinsic facts. In Section 66, however,
the warranties of an unqualified indorser run "to all subsequent
holders in due course". The negative implication is that such war-
ranties do not run to holders not in due course. Why this difference
between the two sections? It is believed there is none, if Section 66
is properly construed. The expression "holder in due course" as
used in Section 66 means something quite different from what it
does elsewhere in the Act. It is believed that all the framers of
the Act meant to convey by saying that warranties ran only to
holders in due course was that they would run only to purchasers
for value who had no knowledge of the facts constituting the breach
of warranty. That is, they expressly incorporated in Section 66,
the common law rule that knowledge of such facts negatived the
implied warranty. They did so in rather unusual language. But
this is no more unusual than to have omitted the same common law
qualification in Section 65. Unless the term "holder in due course"
in Section 66 is given the special meaning above suggested, results
in certain cases will be quite unjust. To illustrate: the plaintiff is
an indorsee for value after maturity in good faith from a fraudulent
payee. Not being a holder in due course he could not recover from
the maker. Would it seriously be contended that he could not recover
from the payee indorser on the latter's warranty that the instrument
was "valid and subsisting"? Moreover, such construction brings
Section 65 and Section 66 into harmony on the matter as to the
parties to whom liabilities run, as they should be.
[Vol. d12
